Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

6-7-2011

Arbitration Case Law Update 2011
Jill I. Gross
Pace Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jill I. Gross & Christopher Bloch, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in Securities Arbitration 2011 (PLI
Course Handbook, June 7, 2011), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/1042.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Arbitration Case Law Update 2011
By
Jill I. Gross
Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills
Director, Investor Rights Clinic, Pace Law School
and
Christopher Bloch
Law Graduate Assistant, Pace Investor Rights Clinic
Research Scholar, Institute of International Commercial Law,
Pace Law School

June 7, 2011

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858249

Parties to arbitration agreements sometimes invoke the
judicial system to litigate collateral issues arising out of the
arbitration process, such as arbitrability of some or all of the
claims, arbitrator bias, and award enforcement or vacatur. When
deciding these collateral issues arising out of securities arbitration,
courts interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§
1 et seq. (2010) (“FAA”).1 In this chapter, we identify recent
judicial decisions in the area of arbitration law, and analyze their
impact on securities arbitration practice.
I.

U.S. Supreme Court

Since the PLI Arbitration Law Update 2010 was published
last June, the United States Supreme Court has remained very
active in the area of arbitration law, issuing two opinions
interpreting the FAA, and granting certiorari on two additional
cases involving two different defenses to arbitrability (waiver and
public policy).
A. Who Decides Arbitrability?
The Supreme Court has observed that the question of “who
– court or arbitrator – has the primary authority to decide whether
a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a
party resisting arbitration.”2 Although the Court has held
repeatedly “that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,”3 it has
reversed that presumption on the question of “who decides”
questions of arbitrability. Thus, courts decide substantive

1

Because securities arbitration necessarily “involves commerce” (FAA §
2 (2010)), it is deemed under the auspices of the FAA. See Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
2
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
3
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626 (1985).

2
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arbitrability, or “gateway” issues that parties would likely expect a
court to determine, such as the validity of an arbitration agreement
itself or the breadth of an arbitration agreement, unless there is
evidence of the “clear and unmistakable” intention of the parties to
have arbitrators decide that issue.4 In contrast, arbitrators decide
questions of procedural arbitrability: those issues “which grow out
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.”5
The Court found such “clear and unmistakable” evidence
in a decision it handed down at the end of its 2009-10 term. In
Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Jackson,6 a 5-4 decision authored by
Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas
and Alito, the Court held that an arbitration agreement may validly
delegate to the arbitrators the power to decide a challenge to
arbitrability on the grounds of unconscionability, unless the
unconscionability challenge focuses specifically on the delegation
provision.
Respondent Antonio Jackson filed an employment
discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in federal district court
in Nevada against his employer, petitioner Rent-A-Center. As a
condition of employment, Rent-A-Center had required Jackson to
sign a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (“Agreement”)
which provided, in relevant part, “for arbitration of all ‘past,
present or future’ disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment
with Rent-A-Center, including ‘claims for discrimination’ and
‘claims for violation of any federal . . . law.’”7 The Agreement
explicitly stated that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or

4

See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
See, e.g., Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (citation and internal quotation
omitted) (holding that a federal district court should not interpret the
NASD six-year eligibility rule because the decision is presumptively
reserved for the arbitrator).
6
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
7
Id. at 2775.
5
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local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any
dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or
formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any
claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”8
Invoking the Agreement in district court, Rent-A-Center
moved for an order compelling arbitration of the employment
dispute. Jackson opposed the motion, asserting that the Agreement
was unenforceable as unconscionable under Nevada law because it
contained an unfavorable fee-sharing arrangement.9 The district
court found that the Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated
to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to determine its
enforceability, even in the face of an unconscionability challenge.10
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of
Appeals held that, when “a party challenges an arbitration
agreement as unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not
meaningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of
unconscionability is for the court.”11
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding
that parties may – by agreement – delegate to the arbitrators a
question of arbitrability. The Court acknowledged that the FAA
“places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
contracts,” and requires courts to enforce their terms subject only
to general contract defenses.12 The FAA operates on “an
additional, antecedent agreement” that delegates to the arbitrators
8

Id.
Id.
10
Id. The district court added that it would have rejected the
unconscionability challenge even if the Agreement had not delegated that
question to the arbitrators for decision. Id. at 2776.
11
Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2009)
(remanding to the district court to determine whether the Agreement was
unconscionable on grounds other than the fee-sharing arrangement).
12
130 S. Ct. at 2776.
9
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the authority to decide a “gateway” issue “just as it does on any
other.”13
In addition, Jackson had not challenged the delegation
provision of the Agreement specifically, but rather “opposed the
motion to compel on the ground that the entire arbitration
agreement, including the delegation clause, was
unconscionable.”14 Thus, the Court held that the arbitrator, and not
the courts, had the authority to consider Jackson’s
unconscionability challenge.
The Supreme Court’s decisions under the FAA reflect the
tension between freedom of contract and arbitrator accountability.
In Jackson, the Court reinforced its commitment to enforcing the
terms of an arbitration agreement that demonstrate the “clear and
unmistakable” intentions of the parties, regardless of how much
power is ceded to the arbitrators.
B. FAA Preemption
Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA
jurisprudence is that FAA §2 – which declares that agreements to
arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract”15 – preempts state laws that place an arbitration
agreement on unequal footing from other contracts.16 Where a
state law prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of claim,
courts can more readily find FAA preemption. However, courts
have struggled where a generally applicable contract defense, such

13

Id. at 2777-78.
Id. at 2779.
15
9 U.S.C. §2. The latter phrase of this section is known as the FAA’s
“savings clause.”
16
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).
14
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as unconscionability, was arguably being applied in a manner that
was de facto disfavoring arbitration.
The Court faced this question in its second arbitration law
decision in the past year. In AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,
the Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank
rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts as unconscionable.”17
In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T
Mobility, LLC (“AT&T”) included a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs from bringing
class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated
on an individual basis. In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in
district court, alleging that AT&T’s practice of charging sales tax
on a phone advertised as “free” was fraudulent.18 In December
2006, after the Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the
arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T would pay a customer
$7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on
the merits of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the last
AT&T settlement offer.19 Two years later, after the Concepcions’
case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter
alia, identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved
to compel arbitration under the revised agreement.20
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration
agreement under FAA §2’s savings clause. The court concluded
that the class action waiver of the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions

17

131 S. Ct. 1740 (Apr. 27, 2011).
Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009).
Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006.
19
Id.
20
Id.
18
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and the efficient resolution of third party claims.21 After the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, on an interlocutory appeal, the district court’s
conclusion that the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable
and that the FAA did not preempt the Discover Bank rule,22 AT&T
sought review in the Supreme Court.
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
in which Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and
Alito) authored a plurality opinion and Justice Thomas authored a
concurring opinion, held that the FAA preempts California’s
Discover Bank interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule.
The Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule created a
different law of unconscionability for class action waivers in
adhesive arbitration contracts.23 Thus, the FAA preempts the rule,
as it singles out arbitration clauses for suspect treatment.24
21

Id.
Id. at 853-55, 856-69.
23
The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may
refuse to enforce a contract that it finds “‘to have been unconscionable at
the time it was made,’” or it may “‘limit the application of any
unconscionable clause,’” 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Ann.
§ 1670.5(1) (1985)). “A finding of unconscionability requires a
‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on
‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on
‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citations
omitted). In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal.
2005), the California Supreme Court applied this unconscionability law
to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held:
22

[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the
exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its]
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property

7

The Court rejected the Concepcions’ argument that the
Court should defer to the California Supreme Court’s analysis of
its own unconscionability doctrine and instead use an objective
determination on whether or not the rule is “tantamount to a rule of
non-enforceability of arbitration agreements.”25 Rather, the
plurality was persuaded by research which demonstrated that state
courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement
unconscionable as opposed to other contracts.26 The plurality also
noted that, although California’s “rule does not require class-wide
arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it
ex post,” thus defeating the purposes of the FAA.27

of another.” Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.
Id. at 162-63.
AT&T identified three principles from Discover Bank that it contended
courts applied differently to arbitration agreements than to other
contracts: (1) the effect on third parties; (2) the timing of the
unconscionability decisions; and (3) the shock the conscience standard.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
( 2011).
25
Id. at 39.
26
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
27
Id. at 1750. The Court discussed three characteristics of class
arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder
the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality
and speed; (2) a requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an
increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review. Id. at 175152. Although the plurality expressly included the procedural expediency
of arbitration as one of the FAA’s purposes with which the Discover
Bank rule interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter
decision in which it specifically “reject[s] the suggestion that the
overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution
of claims.” Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
24
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Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion was fueled by a singular
distrust of class arbitration, a distrust that also appeared in the
Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp.28 In contrast, the dissent claimed that class proceedings are
necessary to protect against small-value claims falling through the
cracks of the legal system.29 Justice Scalia responded to the
dissent’s concern by stating that “States cannot require a procedure
that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for
unrelated reasons.”30
Justice Thomas agreed with the result, but on slightly
different grounds. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
reasoned that the savings clause of the FAA permits exceptions to
the enforceability of arbitration agreements only for defenses that
“relate[] to the making of the [arbitration] agreement.”31 Because
the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the making of the
arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§2 and 4,
Justice Thomas concluded that it is preempted by the FAA. While
Justice Thomas’ interpretation of FAA §2 differed from prior
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and was not briefed or advocated by
the parties, his vote was necessary for the 5-4 reversal. Thus, his
opinion, which arguably rests on narrower grounds than the
plurality’s, may be considered controlling for future cases.
There seems to be little doubt that this decision will have
an adverse impact on consumer arbitration, as it effectively
eliminates class arbitration as a procedural method of aggregating
low value claims that are subject to an otherwise enforceable
arbitration agreement. However, if courts construe the decision
more narrowly as preempting only California’s “Discover Bank
rule,” rather than unconscionability rules nationally, the decision
28

130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30
Id. at 1753.
31
Id. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting FAA § 4).
29
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won’t have quite the broad-reaching impact predicted by some
commentators.32 In the end, Congressional action may be the only
way to preserve class arbitration.
C. Waiver
While federal courts tout the strong national policy
favoring arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
they disfavor disputants who appear to be using that national
policy to manipulate the court system and prejudice adverse
parties. In recent years, they have embraced the waiver defense –
a claim that one party to an arbitration clause has waived its right
to arbitrate based on conduct in parallel litigation. As discussed
below, the Supreme Court appears headed to decide the scope of
the waiver defense next term.
Courts generally find a party has waived its right to
arbitration “when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices
the opposing party.”33 While the waiver test varies slightly among
the federal circuits, courts typically consider factors such as: (1)
the time elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request
for arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including
32

See, e.g., Sarah Cole, “Continuing the Discussion of the AT&T v.
Concepcion Decision: Implications for the Future,” posting to ADR Prof
Blog, http://www. indisputably.org/?p=2312 (Apr. 27, 2011) (“It would
appear that the era of class arbitration is over before it really ever began –
unless Congress can be persuaded to amend the FAA to permit class
arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where consumers
are unlikely to have practical recourse to a remedy through traditional
bilateral arbitration”); Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back Mandatory
Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 2011 (quoting
lawyer for Concepcions as stating “’[t]he decision will make it harder for
people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of claims that
stem from corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful
compensation’”).
33
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., No. 092904-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9358, at *2 (2d Cir. May 7, 2010).
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substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party
opposing arbitration.34 Prejudice “refers to the inherent unfairness
– in terms of delay, expense or damage to a party’s legal position –
that occurs when the party’s opponent forces it to litigate an issue
and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue.”35
A recent case involving a FINRA member firm illustrates
the lower courts’ approach to the waiver defense. In Louisiana
Stadium Exposition District v. Merrill Lynch,36 the Second
Circuit refused to reverse the district court’s denial of a motion to
compel arbitration on the ground that plaintiff Louisiana Stadium
Exposition District (“LSED”) had waived its right to enforce the
pre-dispute arbitration clause. LSED initiated identical
proceedings in Louisiana state court and the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana against Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company, and, shortly thereafter, added claims against
three separate Merrill Lynch entities, including Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (“MLPFS”), the ultimate sole
defendant. Eleven months after these filings, LSED moved to
compel arbitration against MLPFS.37
The court considered the three National Union factors in
its waiver analysis. While acknowledging that no factor by itself is
dispositive in finding waiver, the court specifically singled out the
34

See Id.
Id. (citing In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162-63
(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted)).
36
626 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2010).
37
During that eleven-month time period, defendants (1) filed a motion to
remove the state court action to federal court; (2) filed a motion to
transfer the case to the Southern District of New York; (3) moved to stay
the proceedings in Louisiana federal court pending the decision of a
Multidistrict Litigation Panel to centralize in one district four related
cases pending against defendants in other districts; (4) submitted to
LSED a nineteen-page letter identifying all the perceived deficiencies in
the second amended complaint; (5) filed an answer to the third amended
complaint; and (6) began work on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 159.
35
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third factor, proof of prejudice, as the “key to a waiver analysis.”38
The Second Circuit found both procedural and substantive
prejudice caused by LSED’s delay in moving to compel
arbitration. Procedurally, in addition to MLPFS’s spending of
significant resources in its motion practice to date, the court found
that LSED had only pursued arbitration after MLPFS had
submitted a detailed letter addressing perceived deficiencies in
LSED’s second amended complaint, and again, only after LSED
had unsuccessfully attempted to defeat the motion to transfer the
case to the Southern District of New York.
Substantively, the court found that MLPFS would be
prejudiced by the preemption of consideration on the “inevitable
motion for judgment on the pleadings which was plainly
foreshadowed by the detailed deficiency letter.”39 In short, by
waiting for MLPFS to submit answers to LSED’s amended
complaints and receive the detailed deficiency letter, LSED
obtained significant benefit which would not have been available
in an arbitration proceeding. By denying LSED’s motion to
compel arbitration, the Second Circuit reinforced its reluctance to
allow litigants to invoke arbitration clauses only after litigation has
not gone their way.
Not surprisingly, in light of the increase in waiver cases
surrounding arbitration, the Supreme Court granted certiorari this
term to consider – for the first time – the scope of the waiver
defense. In Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A,40 the Court
agreed to consider whether, under the FAA, prejudice is a required
element of the waiver defense. In the opinion below, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding that

38

Id.
Id. at 160.
40
131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
39
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Citibank had waived its right to arbitrate a claim brought by Stok
& Associates, P.A.41
Stok is a law firm that had deposited a large check from a
client into its Citibank bank account.42 Citibank discovered the
check was actually a forgery and removed the funds from Stok’s
account.43 A dispute arose concerning Citibank’s actions, and Stok
filed a complaint in Florida state court alleging various state law
causes of action.44 About six weeks later, Citibank answered the
complaint without reference to the pre-dispute arbitration clause in
the bank’s customer agreement with Stok.45 Within a few weeks,
Stok served an offer of judgment and a discovery request on
Citibank, and filed a reply to the answer and a notice of readiness
with the state court.46 Less than one month after it filed its answer,
Citibank sent a letter to Stok electing arbitration, which Stok
rejected.47 The next day, Citibank filed a motion to compel
arbitration in state court, but then withdrew that motion and
instead filed a petition to compel arbitration in federal district court
for the Southern District of Florida.48 The state court then stayed
discovery for 60 days in the pending resolution of the federal court
action, and removed the case from the trial docket.49
The federal district court denied Citibank’s petition to
compel arbitration on the ground advanced by Stok – that Citibank
had waived its right to elect arbitration because of its participation

41

Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Associates, P.A., 387 Fed. Appx. 921 (11th
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
42
Id. at 922.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at .
47
Id. at 922-23.
48
Id. at 923.
49
Id.
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in the state court action.50 In its decision, the district court applied
the Eleventh Circuit’s two-prong waiver test, which required the
movant to show the waiving party acted inconsistently with its
right to arbitration and its actions prejudiced the moving party.
Citibank appealed.51 The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground
that, even if Stok met its burden of showing that Citibank acted
inconsistently with its right to arbitration, it had not demonstrated
that Citibank’s conduct prejudiced Stok.52
Stok then sought review in the Supreme Court, arguing
that there is a conflict among the circuits as to whether prejudice is
a necessary element of the arbitration waiver analysis.53 Stok
argued that a majority of circuits (nine) required a showing of
prejudice, and a minority of circuits (three) did not.54 Stok also
argued that the Court should rule that no showing of prejudice
should be required, as such a requirement violates long-standing
principles of common law contract.55 Citibank filed a very brief
opposition (five pages) to the Petition, arguing only that there was
no conflict in the circuits, as even the three circuits that did not
explicitly include prejudice as a prong of its formal waiver test did
consider prejudice as one factor in the overall analysis.56
Since the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it appears the
Court concluded that the circuits were indeed split on this issue.
Thus, the issue is quite simple and clearly crystallized before the
Court: Should courts require a showing of prejudice before
concluding that a party has waived its right to arbitration?
50

Id.
Id. at 924.
52
Id. at 924-25.
53
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A. v. Citibank, N.A.,
2010 WL 4090959, *6-7 (Oct. 14, 2010).
54
Id., *7-14.
55
Id., *15-31.
56
See generally Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A.
v. Citibank N.A., 2011 WL 63537 (Jan. 5, 2011).
51
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Why did the Court take this case? The circuit courts
themselves have not acknowledged that a conflict exists among
them on the waiver question. Moreover, the Court’s FAA
jurisprudence instructs lower courts to resolve questions of
arbitrability in favor of arbitration – which would suggest
requiring the party resisting arbitration to make a strong showing
before finding that a party seeking arbitration had waived its right
to arbitration. This strong showing presumably would stem from,
in part, prejudice to the party opposing arbitration. Third, the facts
in this case do not cry out for a finding of prejudice. As the
Eleventh Circuit noted in its opinion, courts that have found
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration were faced with far
more compelling facts: litigation activities for several years, rather
than the few weeks present in Stok; and motion practice and
extensive discovery requiring the party opposing arbitration to
incur substantial legal fees and other litigation costs, unlike the
relatively brief reply to answer and other litigation documents that
Stok filed and served in the intervening weeks in this case. Thus,
even if the Court were to conclude that prejudice is a requirement
before finding an arbitration waiver, no prejudice was present here,
as the circuit court concluded.
On the other hand, if the Court rules that prejudice is not
required, this is not a case that plainly calls out for application of
the waiver doctrine, as Citibank’s conduct in the five-week time
period at issue was arguably not even inconsistent with its right to
arbitration. Finally, Citibank, a national banking institution with
substantial litigation resources, barely opposed Stok’s certiorari
petition, suggesting even Citibank did not think the issues on
appeal were ripe for Supreme Court intervention.
Finally, even if the Supreme Court affirms the Eleventh
Circuit and retains the prejudice prong of the waiver test, the
Eleventh Circuit had remanded the case to the district court for

15

consideration of Stok’s other arbitrability arguments opposing the
motion to compel arbitration. Thus, victory in the Supreme Court
would not result in an automatic grant of Citibank’s petition to
compel arbitration. It would only ensure a date back in district
court for consideration of Stok’s other arguments opposing the
petition.
D. Arbitrability of Federal Statutory Claim

Since its watershed decision in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon57 that federal securities law claim are
arbitrable, the Supreme Court has held consistently that plaintiffs
could vindicate their rights arising under federal statutes in
arbitration, and thus federal statutory claims were arbitrable as a
matter of public policy. In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,58
the Court accepted a second arbitration case for next term, and
agreed to resolve a circuit split on the question of whether claims
arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1679 et seq.(“CROA”), are arbitrable.
The Ninth Circuit had decided in the opinion below that
Congress intended to preclude arbitration of claims arising under
the CROA, a consumer protection statute, when it provided
consumers with a “right to sue” violators of the prohibitions in the
statute.59 Because that Ninth Circuit decision conflicted with
opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit split.
What is notable is that many claims arising under the
CROA are pursued in class actions, as they typically are too small
for consumers to bring them individually. Since the Court this
57

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
79 U.S.L.W. 3442, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3404 (May 2, 2011).
59
Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir.
2010).
58
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term effectively eliminated class arbitration of consumer protection
claims in Concepcion, the stakes are quite high for consumers. A
decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit holding that CROA claims are
arbitrable could eliminate the ability of many consumers to
vindicate their CROA statutory rights.
II.

Notable Lower Federal Court Decisions
A. Challenges to Arbitrability
1. Was there an enforceable arbitration
agreement?

Before a court can grant a motion to compel arbitration
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. In
Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp.,60 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether a brokerage firm customer’s alleged
limited understanding of the English language precluded a
“meeting of the minds” with respect to the customer agreement
which contained the pre-dispute arbitration clause. Plaintiff Alfred
Janiga, a Polish immigrant, sued his broker, Weislaw Hessek, a
registered representative of Questar Capital (who also happened to
be Janiga’s brother), Hessek’s financial services company, and
Questar Capital in federal district court in Illinois to recover
investment losses. Questar moved to compel arbitration, but
Janiga resisted on the ground that, inter alia, he did not understand
the customer agreement and saw only one page of it.61 While the
Court of Appeals acknowledged Janiga’s contention that all of his
communications with Hessek were in Polish, the court also
remarked that Janiga had lived and worked in Illinois for more

60
61

615 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 739.
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than twenty years and was a principal of a company specializing in
residential and commercial remodeling.62
The Seventh Circuit found that a valid arbitration clause
existed, reasoning that Janiga’s signature on the customer account
agreement, which he admitted he gave voluntarily, “objectively
demonstrated his assent to the contract.”63 The court noted that the
“unambiguous” arbitration clause was in all capital letters, just
above Janiga’s signature.64 Thus, Janiga entered into a valid
arbitration agreement with Questar.
Investors whose primary language is not English beware:
the Court of Appeals’ lack of sympathy, and perhaps even disdain,
for Janiga’s alleged limited understanding of English is palpable in
the opinion. At least according to this decision, investors who sign
a customer agreement, whether or not they can show they are
capable of understanding it, are bound to its terms.
2. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule
12200?
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, respondents
may resist arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a
“customer” of the FINRA member firm within the meaning of
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule
12200. That rule provides that a FINRA member firm must
arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is
between a customer and a member or associated person of a
member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the business
activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”65
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The Second Circuit recently contributed to the growing
body of circuit court opinions interpreting FINRA Rule 12200. In
UBS Securities, LLC v. Voegeli,66 the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting
Swiss investors from arbitrating securities fraud claims against
UBS Securities, Inc. Defendants were Swiss citizens who were
seed investors in HealtheTech, Inc., a company for which UBS
acted as a financial advisor and underwriter in its initial public
offering.67 When HealtheTech’s post-IPO stock value declined,
the Swiss investors filed an arbitration claim against UBS alleging,
inter alia, securities fraud.68
A FINRA arbitration panel rejected UBS’ claim that the
Swiss investors, who did not purchase their HealtheTech securities
through a brokerage account at UBS, were not its “customers,” and
declined to halt the arbitration.69 UBS then sought injunctive relief
in the district court for the Southern District of New York, on the
grounds that defendants had never been “customers” of UBS, as
required by FINRA Rule 12200.70 The district court issued a
permanent injunction, finding both irreparable harm and success
on the merits.71 The district court noted that parties will not
become “customers” under FINRA’s Code of Arbitration
Procedure merely because they were shareholders of a company
that a broker-dealer advised in connection with an IPO.72
The Second Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction,
agreeing with the district court that the Swiss investors were not
customers of UBS nor did they have a contract requiring
66
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2010).
68
Id. at 352-53.
69
Id. at 353.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 354-56.
72
Id. at 356.
67

19

arbitration.73 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that “[b]eing forced to arbitrate a claim one did
not agree to arbitrate constitutes an irreparable harm for which
there is no adequate remedy at law.”74
3. Are “collective actions” arbitrable under
FINRA Rule 12204/13204?
A federal district court in the Southern District of New
York, in Velez v. Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp.,75
addressed the issue of whether the class arbitration ban under
FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure extends to collective
actions. Silva Alexander Velez, an employee of FINRA member
Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp. (“Perrin”), sued Perrin
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and
New York’s Labor Law on behalf of himself and similarly situated
brokers employed or formerly employed by Perrin. Velez asked
the district court to designate the suit as a “collective action” under
the FLSA, and to designate his state law claims as a class action.
Perrin subsequently moved to dismiss the action, or
alternatively, to compel FINRA arbitration of the FLSA claims
under FAA § 3 and pursuant to the arbitration clause in the
“Account Executive At-Will Employment Agreement.” Although
Perrin could not seek arbitration of the state law claims, because
FINRA Rule 13204 explicitly prohibits the arbitration of “class
action claims,” Perrin argued that collective actions are separate
and distinct from class action claims, and thus the FLSA claims
were arbitrable. Velez contended that FINRA Rule 13204 should
be interpreted to encompass collective actions as well as class
action claims.
73

405 Fed. Appx. at 552.
Id. (citing Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d
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Following other district courts that have considered the
issue, the Velez court ruled that collective actions should be
considered separate and distinct from class action claims.
Although class actions and collective actions share similar
characteristics, the court focused on one, and, in its opinion,
significant, difference – the fact that class actions are opt-out
actions while collective actions are opt-in actions.77 In an opt-out
action, each member of the class must affirmatively act to remove
himself from the action, but in an opt-in action, the members of the
class must act in order to participate in the action. Thus, in a
collective action, the decision will “bind only similarly situated
plaintiffs who have affirmatively consented to join the action.”78
As a result, the district court compelled arbitration of plaintiffs’
FLSA claims.
76

Notably, the court rejected opinion letters from FINRA
staff members (including an Assistant General Counsel and the
Director of Arbitration) construing collective actions as within the
meaning of Rule 12304.79 The court refused to take those letters
into account because FINRA – as well as the authors themselves –
indicated that staff opinions are merely that – the personal opinions
of those staff members who work for FINRA, and they do not bind
FINRA or its Board. The court noted that, if FINRA intends to
prohibit collective actions, it may do so by amending its rules.
The court’s refusal to give deference to FINRA staff
opinion letters construing FINRA’s own Code of Arbitration
76

See Gomez v. Brill Securities, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3503, 2010 U.S. Dist.
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Servs., Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2655, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903 (N.D. Ohio
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Procedure seems peculiar. If the Supreme Court defers to FINRA
arbitrators to construe FINRA’s eligibility rule,80 then why
shouldn’t a federal district court defer to FINRA’s Director of
Arbitration to construe FINRA Rules 12204/13204?
4. Can a nonsignatory be estopped from
disclaiming the obligation to arbitrate?
Even when one party to a multiparty dispute did not sign
an arbitration agreement, courts have, on rare occasion, compelled
a nonsignatory to arbitrate under the doctrine of estoppel. In the
arbitration context, this doctrine generally requires a signatory to
arbitrate (and not disclaim an obligation to arbitrate) claims with a
nonsignatory when the nonsignatory’s claims are “inextricably
intertwined” with the agreement signed by the signatory.
The Eighth Circuit considered this doctrine in the context
of a raiding dispute between Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), not
a FINRA member, and UMB Financial Services, Inc. (“UMB”), a
FINRA member.81 Soon after five former BOA employees
(financial advisors who brokered securities through Banc of
America Investment Services (“BOAIS”)) joined UMB, BOA sued
its former employees and UMB in federal court in Missouri
alleging violations of the employees’ non-solicitation agreements.
In addition to pursuing various procedural maneuvers in
the district court, UMB filed a FINRA arbitration claim against
both BOA and BOAIS.82 BOA refused to arbitrate against UMB,
on the grounds that, unlike BOAIS and UMB, it is not a FINRA
member. The district court denied UMB’s motion to compel
arbitration and enjoined the parties from arbitrating pending
80
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resolution of various issues before the district court. After further
proceedings, the district court granted BOA’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, restraining three of its former employees
from further violating their active non-solicitation agreements, and
restraining UMB from doing business with customers obtained in
violation of those agreements.83
UMB and the former employees appealed, arguing that the
district court erred in refusing to compel BOA and BOAIS to
arbitrate before FINRA. UMB argued that BOA should be
estopped from disclaiming the obligation to arbitrate because its
claims are “inextricably intertwined with any claims BOAIS might
bring against the appellants and because BOA seeks to benefit
from its association with BOAIS.”84 The Eighth Circuit rejected
the estoppel argument, because, unlike the typical estoppel
scenario, the nonsignatory here is not the party pursuing
arbitration. The appellate court further held that BOA is not a
third party beneficiary of BOAIS’ arbitration agreements (Forms
U-4) with the BOA former employees.85 Thus, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s refusal to compel BOA to
arbitrate.
Estoppel remains a valid exception to the requirement of
an arbitration agreement, but courts typically limit its use to the
situation where a nonsignatory seeks to compel a signatory to
arbitrate claims inextricably intertwined with an arbitration
agreement. Signatories cannot draw in nonsignatories to an
arbitration simply because the claims are related; nonsignatories
have to indicate a willingness to arbitrate.
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B. Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Award
The First Circuit, in FleetBoston Financial Corp. v. Alt,86
recently considered the res judicata effect of an arbitral award.
The dispute arose out of employment claims of Eric Alt (lead
claimant) and forty-one additional former employees of the brokerdealer Robertson Stephens, Inc. (RSI). Claimants alleged various
theories of liability and sought over $140 million in damages from
Respondents RSI, RSI’s owner, Robertson Stephens Group, Inc.
(RSGI), and RSGI’s owner, FleetBoston Financial Corporation
(Fleet). Arbitration hearings which lasted more than two years
resulted in an award to twenty-seven claimants of over $14
million.87
While the arbitration was in progress, RSI, RSGI and Fleet
filed an action in Massachusetts state court against the Alt
claimants seeking a declaratory judgment and a stay of the
arbitration as to RSGI and Fleet, claiming they were not members
of the NYSE and did not agree to arbitrate.88 After removal, the
district court for the District of Massachusetts declined the stay
request, choosing to stay its own proceeding pending the result of
the arbitration.89
Following the award, both claimants and respondents
sought to remove the stay, which resulted in the district court
confirming the arbitral award.90 The Alt claimants also amended
their initial counterclaim to add claims related to deferred
compensation in the form of a cash equivalent plan (CEP) and a
restricted stock unit plan (RSU). Claimants contended the CEP
and RSU claims were both unresolved and could be brought
86
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against RSGI and Fleet in a new action.91 Fleet and RSGI moved
for summary judgment on the grounds these claims were included
in the arbitral award and “‘barred as a matter of law by reason of
claim preclusion, judicial estoppel, invited error, and payment.’”92
The district court granted the motion, and the Alt claimants
appealed.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that
the arbitral award included the CEP and RSU claims. The Court
of Appeals noted that “[a]n arbitration award generally has res
judicata effect as to all claims heard by the arbitrators.” The
Court concluded, “[i]n light of the manner in which Alt presented
the RSU and CEP claims in its Amended Statement of Claims, the
evidence Alt presented to the panel, and the arbitral award itself, it
is most reasonable to interpret the award’s scope –‘all of the claims
between the parties’ – to include all of Alt’s CEP and RSU
claims.”94
Applying the doctrine of res judicata to arbitration awards
serves the same purpose as in judicial proceedings – it prevents
costly re-litigation of the same issues and provides closure.
Because the Alt claimants took advantage of the opportunity to
litigate their claims during arbitration, the court saw no unfairness
in its decision.95
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C. Post-Award Review
1. Arbitrator Bias
The Seventh Circuit recently considered whether an
arbitrator’s “reputational interest” in being appointed again
impacts his neutrality. In Trustmark Insurance Co. v. Hancock
Life Insurance Co.,96 Hancock Life Insurance Co. (“Hancock”)
and Trustmark Insurance Co. (“Trustmark”) executed a
reinsurance contract which included a pre-dispute arbitration
clause calling for a tripartite arbitration panel.97 Hancock
appointed Mark Gurevitz as its party arbitrator.
After Trustmark lost the arbitration and Hancock
confirmed the award in U.S. District Court in Illinois, Trustmark
refused to honor retrocessional reinsurance contract billings
involved in the first arbitration that were due to Hancock based on
the award.98 Trustmark argued that the confirmed award governed
all of the parties’ dealings, and thus any billings subsequent to the
award were not valid.99
After initiating a new arbitration to resolve the subsequent
disputed bills, Hancock named Gurevitz as its party-appointed
arbitrator once again. Hancock argued that the prior award should
be dispositive in the new dispute, but Trustmark contended that the
second panel should not consider the first award at all due to the
existence of a confidentiality agreement reached during the first
proceeding. The second panel ruled that the confidentiality
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agreement did not preclude the arbitrators themselves from
considering the prior award.100
Before substantive hearings took place, Trustmark sought
an injunction in the district court, arguing that Gurevitz was not a
“disinterested” arbitrator as required by the arbitration agreement’s
appointment procedures. The district court ruled that Gurevitz was
not “disinterested” due to his knowledge of the prior arbitration
and the fact that he could be called as a fact witness about those
proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the term
“disinterested” in the context of an adjudication means “lacking a
financial or other personal stake in the outcome.”101 The court
found that Gurevitz did not, in fact, have any stake in the outcome
of the arbitration beyond a “reputational interest” – the incentive to
rule in favor of the party that appointed him to make it more likely
to be appointed by that party in a future arbitration.102 Because
potential future employment is an interest that is “endemic to
arbitration,” arbitrators cannot be dismissed on the ground that
they may be inclined to support the party that appointed them.103
Rather, “[w]hen one party is entitled to choose its own arbitrator,
and in doing so follows all contractual requirements, a court ought
not abet the other side’s strategy to eject its opponent’s choice.”104
Because FINRA arbitrators also have a reputational
interest in being appointed by repeat players in securities
arbitrations, this case impacts the ability of claimants to argue that
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arbitrators selected and favored by broker-dealers or brokers are
not neutral.
In addition to arbitrator neutrality requirements set forth in
parties’ arbitration agreements and/or forum rules, the FAA
authorizes a court to vacate an arbitration award, inter alia, "where
there was evident partiality …in the arbitrators…,”105 or for “other
misbehavior [by arbitrators] by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.”106 Just as this chapter went to press, the Second
Circuit handed down a decision interpreting these sections in the
context of a FINRA arbitration award. In STMicroelectronics,
N.V. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC,107 Credit Suisse
moved to vacate an award against it for more than $400 million
arising out of its sale of auction-rate securities (“ARS”) to
STMicroelectronics (“ST”), a semiconductor manufacturer, whose
cyclical business required it to keep a lot of cash or cash
equivalents on hand to meet its needs. When the ARS market
froze in August 2007, the ARS owned by ST failed at auction,
rendering them significantly lower in value.108
ST filed a FINRA arbitration claim against Credit Suisse
in February 2008 alleging, inter alia, federal securities fraud,
common law fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
and failure to supervise. During the arbitration, Credit Suisse
unsuccessfully sought to remove one of the arbitrators, who often
testified as a financial expert, for purportedly failing to disclose
details about his prior testimony on behalf of investor-claimants.
After the arbitration panel awarded ST more than $400 million in
compensatory damages, financing fees, attorneys’ fees and
interest, Credit Suisse moved to vacate the award on the grounds
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of “evident partiality,” arbitrator “misbehavior,” and “manifest
disregard of the law.”109
The district court (SDNY) refused to vacate the award, and
also refused to partially offset the award by just under $75 million
following ST’s post-arbitration sale of the ARS to a third party.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court
with respect to the award vacatur, except modified the amount of
the compensatory damages to account for the $75 million offset
and corresponding interest. On the issue of arbitrator bias, the
Court of Appeals noted that Credit Suisse had rightly abandoned
its arguments under the evident partiality prong of the FAA,
because it could not meet the very high burden of showing a
failure to disclose facts demonstrating partiality, which the court
defined as a “relationship with a party, a lawyer or another
arbitrator.” Rather, Credit Suisse alleged only that the arbitrator
had an unfavorable “predisposition.”110
The court then rejected Credit Suisse’s contention that the
arbitrator’s disclosure report was misleading in violation of
FINRA rules. Notably, the appellate court faulted Credit Suisse
for not having taken discovery on the issue of the arbitrator’s
background, which Second Circuit precedent would have
permitted.111 The fact that the arbitrator’s disclosures complied
with FINRA’s own written “explication” of its disclosure
requirements persuaded the appellate court further that the
arbitrator had not engaged in “other misbehavior” within the
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meaning of section 10(a)(3).112 The court concluded that the
arbitrator’s alleged predisposition on issues of law could not be the
basis for vacatur because, as the industry arbitrator, his prior
testimony on and expertise with related issues of law is precisely
what qualifies him to be an industry arbitrator.113
The Court of Appeals then addressed Credit Suisse’s
second argument for vacatur: that the panel must have manifestly
disregarded the law114 applicable to ST’s fraud claim because it did
not enforce against ST the clause in the parties’ agreement
requiring ST to object to trade confirmations within two days and
account statements within ten days,115 and because it ignored the
“reasonable reliance” element of fraud. The Second Circuit
soundly rejected this alternative vacatur ground, reasoning that: (1)
the Modern Settings defense is not a “well-defined, explicit, and
clearly applicable” rule as required by the first prong of the
manifest disregard standard; (2) because the element of
“reasonable reliance” requires an inherently fact-specific analysis,
and Credit Suisse cited all factually distinguishable precedent,
Credit Suisse could not show that the panel disregarded factually
analogous precedent; and (3) even if the panel had disregarded
these valid defenses to ST’s fraud claim, the award did not contain
reasons, so the entire award could have been based on one of ST’s
non-fraud claims.116 Finally, the Second Circuit reduced the award
by $75 million – the amount ST received from the liquidation of its
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ARS, plus the corresponding amount of interest due on that
money.117
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Second Circuit’s
opinion, particularly to securities arbitration aficionados, is its
hostility to Credit Suisse for trying to avoid some of the
consequences of the very arbitration process it imposed on its
customer:
We note again that Credit Suisse could have chosen to
permit its customers to resolve disputes in the courts,
where legal issues such as these could be authoritatively
resolved. It deliberately chose, however, to insist on a
forum in which issues are resolved less formally, without
the necessity for the adjudicator to explain its precise
reasoning or the availability of appellate tribunals to
review and assess that reasoning. Having chosen that
process, with its attendant expedition and lower cost,
Credit Suisse may not now impose on its adversary the
very formalities it elected to eschew, simply because it
does not like the outcome of the process.118
Ouch!
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2. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.119 that parties to an arbitration agreement
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an
award under the FAA, the lower courts have split on whether an
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid
ground to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.120 Since last year’s Arbitration Law
Update, the circuit split continues:
•

The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have acknowledged
the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard” ground
of vacatur.121

•

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly determined
that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur
ground.122

•

The First and Eighth Circuits have addressed “manifest
disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.123
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•

The Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have expressly
declined to address the issue.124
3. Exceeding Powers

While the confusion over the “manifest disregard” ground
of review persists, losing parties in arbitration continue to
challenge arbitration awards on grounds specified in the FAA. In
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Whitney, the
Tenth Circuit considered whether an arbitration panel exceeded its
powers under FAA § 10(a)(4) in interpreting the terms of a
contract, when it considered whether someone possessed the legal
authority to assign beneficiaries to an account, and when it
awarded legal fees to the Appellee.
The dispute between the parties stemmed from two
accounts that were opened by the Appellant’s sister, Suzanne,
following the death of their mother. Suzanne decided to have her
50% share of their mother’s two IRA accounts placed into two
beneficiary-controlled accounts with the Appellee bank, Merrill
Lynch. When opening the accounts, Suzanne was required to fill
out a standard “Merrill Lynch Client Relation Agreement (CRA),”
which was used to specify the type of account and assign
beneficiaries. When filling out the agreement, Suzanne assigned
two beneficiaries to the first account, while assigning none to the
second.
Following Suzanne’s death, the Appellant asserted that
under the CRA and Oklahoma law, the second account which was
124
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assigned no beneficiaries belonged to their mother’s estate, and
should revert to her heirs, which was the Appellant.126 During
arbitration, the panel relied on a format flaw contained in the CRA,
and determined that this flaw was the reason no beneficiaries were
named to the second account. Based on this determination, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the panel did
not exceed its power in making a factual determination that
Suzanne intended for the beneficiaries named in account one to
also be assigned to account two.127
Appellant also argued that Suzanne never had legal
authority to name beneficiaries to either of the accounts, because
“when Suzanne inherited IRA accounts from her mother, she
elected to retain her ‘beneficiary’ status and not become the
‘owner’ of the accounts.”128 Based on this assertion, the
Appellant contended that Internal Revenue Service regulations
forbid Suzanne from assigning beneficiaries to the accounts, as this
right was reserved to the true owner, which was their mother. The
panel disagreed, and instead relied on an expert witness’ testimony
that an IRA becomes the account of a designated beneficiary upon
the death of its owner. Thus, Suzanne became the owner of her
share of the IRA, and was free to assign beneficiaries at her will.
As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
that the panel did not exceed its powers in making this
determination.129
Finally, the Appellant argued that the panel exceeded its
power in awarding legal fees to the Appellee in the absence of
supporting detail, purportedly required by Oklahoma law.
However, because the district court had identified Oklahoma
precedent which provided an exception to the documentation
126
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requirement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the arbitration panel was not acting “arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable” in awarding
fees and costs to the Appellee.130
II. A Few Notable State Court Decisions
A. Statutes of Limitation
Securities arbitration practitioners are routinely faced with
the question of whether statutes of limitation are applicable in
arbitration. This past year, a Florida court joined the growing
number of jurisdictions that have held that statutes of limitation
apply to actions in court, but not arbitrations. In Phillips v.
Raymond James Financial Services, Inc.,131 the court was tasked
with determining the timeliness of arbitration claims for
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty (based on suitability and
failure to supervise claims), as well as statutory fraud under
Florida’s securities statute.132 Following a Florida Supreme Court
1995 precedent,133 the circuit court determined that Florida statutes
of limitation do not apply to FINRA arbitration.
B. Confidentiality
In Dever v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,134 a Massachusetts
Superior Court overturned a confidentiality order imposed by a
FINRA arbitration panel on First Amendment grounds. Claimant
130
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James Dever contended that the FINRA gag order, which required
confidential treatment of all details of the twenty-day hearing’s
testimony, documents and hearing transcripts, restricted him from
clearing his reputation which allegedly had been tarred by the
disclosures included on his Form U-5.
Parties to arbitration commonly enter into confidentiality
agreements either in their arbitration clauses or during the
discovery phase of the dispute.135 Although gag orders that bar
parties from discussing a case while it is pending are not
uncommon, Dever argued that a broad order imposing
confidentiality after the case is heard is unprecedented. For
example, the Seventh Circuit, in Citizens First Nat’l Bank v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co.,136 required “good cause” before sealing
documents and presumed public access to those materials that did
not meet this requirement. The Court of Appeals suggested that
courts have begun to resist “standardless, stipulated, permanent,
frozen [and] overbroad blanket [confidentiality] order[s].”137
In Dever, Judge McIntyre stated that members of FINRA
forums do not expect their proceedings to be cloaked in secrecy,
and that arbitrators should not be able to conceal the proceedings
under broad confidentiality orders. Such orders, under McIntyre’s
analysis, offend free speech protection under the First Amendment.
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This decision made clear that courts will not blindly
enforce confidentiality orders, but will examine them to determine
if they unlawfully restrict the constitutional rights of the parties
involved. It will be interesting to see how other courts begin
treating confidentiality orders, and whether they adopt Judge
McIntyre’s analysis.
C. Post-Award Review
While the federal circuits are split as to whether manifest
disregard of the law is a valid basis of vacatur (see supra, § II.D),
some state courts still recognize that standard of review. In
Wiederhorn v. Merkin, a New York Supreme Court judge applied
the manifest disregard standard to a challenge to a $1.75 million
award arising out of a Madoff-related dispute.138
When Claimant moved to confirm the award, Respondent
cross-moved to vacate the award on the grounds that the findings
were “totally irrational” and in manifest disregard of the law.139
The court acknowledged that New York courts recognize the
FAA’s manifest disregard provision, but severely limit the doctrine
by restricting its application to situations of “last resort limited to
the rare occurrences of apparent ‘egregious impropriety’ on the
part of the arbitrators, ‘where none of the provisions of the FAA

138

See Wiederhorn v. Merkin, 601265/2010, NYLJ, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. Aug 6, 2010). Respondent J. Ezra Merkin was the General and
Managing Partner of Ascot Partners, L.P. (“Ascot”), a private investment
partnership for U.S. investors. Petitioner Noel M. Wiederhorn
(“Wiederhorn”) owned a Delaware IRA which invested a total of
$1,492,040.47 in Ascot, and Ascot subsequently invested “substantially
all” of its assets in an account with Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities. Id. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme “rendered the value of Ascot
virtually worthless,” thus losing “substantially all” of Widerhorn’s
investment in Ascot. Id.
139
Id. at *5.
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apply.’”140 This extreme deference to the arbitrators’ decision will
be overcome only if the party moving for vacatur shows that: (1)
the arbitrators had known of a governing legal principle; (2) they
refused to apply or altogether ignored that principle; and (3) the
ignored law was well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case at hand.141
In the case at hand, the court concluded that, due to a split
in the Appellate Divisions within New York State on the
applicable point of law, it could not find the arbitrators manifestly
disregarded the law because the third element’s “well-defined”
requirement could not be satisfied. Significantly for securities
arbitration practitioners, the court also upheld the arbitrators’
freedom to apply principles of equity and their own sense of the
law when rendering an award. In Wiederhorn, the majority of the
tribunal stated clearly in its award that it based many of its
decisions on principles of equity. As a result, the trial court denied
the motion for vacatur and confirmed the award.

140
141

Id. at *6.
Id.
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